ABSTRACT Internet of Things (IoT) devices are basic units in edge computing. Denial of service (DoS) attack is a great threat to low-cost IoT devices, even worse in privacy-preserving authentication protocols for radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. During DoS attacks, the attacker consumes the legal states in a target tag by continuous scanning and further observes its behavior in authentication to break privacy. Due to lack of adequate energy and computing power, it is hard for passive backscattering RFID tags to defend against DoS attacks. In this work, we cast a new insight on the DoS attacks to RFID tags and leverage the malicious scanning behavior as a new energy source. In this way, a passive tag gains more and more energy and can afford more and more complex cryptography computation under a DoS attack. Finally, the victim tag with adequate energy achieves to complete the complicated public key cryptographic computations and defend against the DoS attack. We further propose a protocol, namely the RUND protocol. We define the tracking privacy model and introduce in the notion of tracking interval to define the tracking privacy other than indistinguishable privacy. To guarantee the security and tracking privacy properties of our protocol, we propose 3 rules as designing guidelines. The analysis shows that our approach can achieve O(1) efficiency while providing DoS-defending privacy-preserving authentication. Furthermore, with proper parameters our approach can save about 40% boosting time at least, compared to the directly charging for public key cryptographic computation method.
I. INTRODUCTION
RFID is a promising technology for wide variety of areas including edge computing. It can be used for identification [1] , inventory [2] , localization [3] , tracing [1] , behavior identification [4] , motion detection [5] , and et al. RFID tags can be active and emit signals periodically with battery power, passive with no battery and only respond on scans, or semi-active while responding on scans with battery. Some computational RFID tags can harvest and store energy for further computation and communication, such as the WISP [6] tags. A typical RFID tag is supposed to be low-cost with limited gate area and thus limited computation ability [7] . protocols employ the symmetric-key computation, with the worry on the high price of public-key encryption in both gate area and energy cost [10] . As a result, many PPA protocols are based on symmetric-key computation and trying to provide sublinear efficiency.
Recently, Avoine et al. [10] discussed the symmetrickey-based sublinear PPA protocols and found that none of them achieves privacy and unlimited desynchronization resistance at the same time. They pointed out that the OSK/AO [12] and OSK/BF [13] protocols clearly stand out [10] . These two protocols are variants of the OSK protocol [14] , which is a synchronization-based protocol. The synchronization-based approaches are promising because they can achieve constant-time authentication. However, such protocols, including the OSK/AO and OSK/BF, suffer from the synchronization issue [10] . The synchronization issue, or the desynchronization attack [15] , is in fact a kind of DoS attack. During such attack, an adversary continuously sends incomplete queries to a victim tag. As a result, the valid states of the tag that were synchronized with the legitimate reader are exhausted. In other words, the tag is desynchronized with the legitimate reader. A desynchronized tag may be not able to pass the authentication [10] . We prove in this paper that the states-limited synchronization-based protocols cannot defend against the DoS based attacks, while we only briefly discussed this difficulty in the preliminary version of this work [11] for the limited space.
The DoS based attacks can be a kind of general threat from side channel. When launched on a target tag, the DoS based attacks can consume or even exhaust the valid responses from the tag, as well as the related states in the tag. After that, the adversary may further track the victim tag [16] , e.g., for service recommendation [17] . How to enable passive RFID tags to defend against the DoS based attacks remains open. For tags with battery, things will not be better because the attacker can literately drain the battery.
In this paper, we focus on how to defend the DoS based attacks. We alternatively use the notion of DoS attack and the DoS based attacks in the following for the ease of reading.
It is non-trivial to defend against the DoS attack, especially for passive RFID tags. We show the main reasons in the following.
Firstly, the DoS attack is even hard to defend against when the victim is more powerful than passive tags. It should be more difficult for the passive tags with very-limited resource.
Secondly, a straightforward method is to add an external device that sends Short Message Service messages, beeps, or blinks on each scan [18] onto each tag. This approach can detect malicious readers. However, it is not friendly for scenarios with multiple tags simultaneously scanned. Moreover, the external device will apparently increase cost.
Thirdly, despite some works on enabling public key cryptography on RFID [19] - [21] , the high computation cost for public key cryptography incurs high energy consumption and may raise power drop [22] possibility or the number of charge cycles [20] . Along with the works on focusing on the fundamental hardware and software supports for sophisticated computing on energy-harvesting systems [23] , [24] , the upper-layer authentication protocols also need to be energy-aware.
According to the work mode of RFID, a tag obtains energy for responding from the continuous wave (CW) from a reader. On the other hand, the DoS behavior is usually based on malicious scans on tags. We find that, to launch DoS attack the adversary should charge the victim tag at first. We further cast a new insight into the DoS attack on RFID tags and try to leverage the DoS attack as a power source for the victim tags to gather energy. The more energy a tag obtains the more applicability it is with to conduct complex computation. From a time point, the tag will be able to defend against the DoS attack with the complex cryptography computations it can afford.
The tag needs to react to the reader's queries, which consumes energy on the tag. Thus, it is not trivial to gain enough power during the DoS attack. There are challenges remaining.
1) How to determine parameters to make sure a tag can gain adequate power for privacy-preserving authentication, even if under the attack of a considerate adversary. For example, the adversary may try to descend a tag's energy by computation and communication consumption in authentication, DoS attack, insufficient charging, or just simple waiting.
2) How to make a tag act differently based on the power level.
3) How to avoid the probably arising problem of timing attack when the tag shifts between weak and powerful.
4) How to defend DoS attack on the backend server, which may lead to time-consuming cryptography computation.
To deal with the first problem, we analyze the charging and consuming of the energy on the tag. We consider all the possible scenarios and provide 3 rules to make sure the tag can obtain adequate power for privacy-preserving authentication even in front of a skilled adversary. The preliminary version of this work [11] only considered 2 rules for the parameter determination, including the energy for the activation of tag and the response of the tag, but neither the protocol-related parameters nor the attack-related parameters. In this version, we propose 3 rules for the determination of the parameters, considering the energy for activation and response, the energy for cryptographically computation and response, the lifecycle of a key, and the energy loss during idle period. The lifecycle of a key is a key parameter related to the ability of DoS defending when the tag respond with symmetric key computation. The energy loss during idle period is considered to defend the possible attack that the adversary wait and let the energy on tag falls to be inadequate for public key cryptography. With more rules tailored to the protocol and the tag design, the protocol can work with privacy guarantee and less energy, as what will be shown in the following sections. These new proposed rules can help defending of more skilled attackers, the quantitative determining of parameters and quantitative analyzing of adequate charging time.
The chips on a RFID tag determines to shift between active and idle depending on the power state, e.g., the voltage supervisor on WISP wakes up the tag from low power mode when the voltage level exceeds 3.3V [25] . Thus, the second problem becomes how to know the available energy in our system. We suggest computational RFID tags, such as the WISP tags that take an onboard capacitor as a chargeable battery. The available energy can be computed by measuring the current voltage of the capacitor. Then the tag can act differently based on the available energy.
For the consideration of timing attack that may arise from the shift in energy status of the tag, we keep the authentication efficiency to be O(1) and the authentication messages to be with the same length, regardless of the energy status. Thus, the timing attack cannot take advantage of any time difference.
Besides, we provide a suggestion to mitigate the possible DoS attack on reader.
Our contributions are fourfold. 1. We prove that the states-limited synchronization-based RFID authentication protocols cannot defend against the DoS attack.
2. We introduce the notion of tracking interval in the privacy model and define our privacy model for tracking privacy other than indistinguishability privacy.
3. We propose a way for low-cost devices such as backscattering RFID tags to defend against the DoS attack. We further put forward the Reviving-Under-DoS protocol or the RUND protocol, which can defend against the DoS attack while providing tracking privacy with O(1) authentication efficiency. Our protocol also satisfies the general security and privacy properties for RFID authentication.
4. We give 3 rules following which the protocol can keep running in secure and private status. Based on the rules, the parameters for protocol running can be determined. With our protocol and the guiding rules, our approach can save at least 40% boosting energy and thus 40% boosting time for charging the tag with proper parameters when SHA-256 and RSA-1024 are used, compared with charging directly for public key cryptography.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the state-of-the-art of the PPA protocols and the notion of backscatting communication with power charging in Section II. In Section III, we prove that the states-limited synchronization approaches cannot defend against DoS attack. We present in detail the RUND protocol in Section IV. We propose 3 rules and show how to determine the parameters for protocol running in Section V. In Section VI, we give our model, including privacy model and definitions for correctness and soundness. In Section VII, we analyze the DoS defending, tracking resistance, as well as other general security and privacy properties of our approach. In Section VIII, we show the performance of our approach. At last, we conclude this work.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we introduce the RFID private authentication and the attacks, especially the DoS attack. We also introduce the backscatter communication with power charging briefly.
A. PRIVACY-PRESERVING AUTHENTICATION OF RFID TAGS
Many work have been done on the privacy protection in RFID authentication [26] . We consider per-tag based authentication in this work where one reader authenticates one tag at each time, while few works about batch-authentication of tags do exist [15] , [27] , [28] . During the per-tag RFID authentication, the reader connected to a backend server launches the authentication process by sending queries to a tag that enters its working range. The tag responds with an authentication message. The reader decides whether the response message comes from a legitimate tag. If yes, the reader tries to complete the mutual authentication with the tag by emitting authenticating message to the tag. The main cost for the reader in a PPA protocol is to search in the backend server to find the matching information for the tag under scan efficiently without privacy leakage.
Due to the huge size of RFID systems, studies mainly focus on how to design PPA protocols with sublinear efficiency [10] . Because otherwise the service delay for the search may be not acceptable. There existed two kinds of symmetric key based protocols that can improve efficiency, with either shared-key structure [29] , [30] or synchronized states [12] , [16] , [31] .
In the protocols with shared-key structure, there may exist a key or some keys shared by different tags. For example, Buttyán et al. [29] proposed to organize keys in a virtual tree, turning the authentication of a tag to the matching of the relative keys in the tree. In such tree-based approaches, each leaf node is uniquely assigned to a tag by storing the unique key of this tag. Each non-leaf node in the tree also stores a key. The keys on the path from the root to the tag can thus be used to divide this tag from other tags in the system. Cheon et al. [30] utilized a two-level structure to manage the keys. Each tag in this approach has a unique pair of two keys. In this way, the authentication can be completed by verifying this unique pair of two keys. The shared-key structure can help accelerating the searching process for the matching key. Because the candidates without any verified key can be passed over to reduce the searching space. Generally, the efficiency of the protocols with shared-key structure is improved to O(logN ), where N is the size of the RFID system. Unfortunately, due to the shared-key structure, two tags may share at least one key. Thus, compromising one tag may lead to key leakage of another tag, which incurs privacy problem [10] , e.g., the leaked key(s) can be used to distinguish tags sharing the leaked information from those not sharing. Although no element is showing that sharing secrets between tags is a definitely flawed way of improve efficiency, whether it is possible without any loss of security or privacy remains an open question [10] .
Another way to fulfil the efficiency requirement for wide deployment is to keep synchronized states between the legitimate reader and each tag [12] , [16] , [31] , namely the synchronization based approaches. In these approaches, the reader knows the available legitimate states of all tags. Thus, it can pre-compute and store all the possible responses for each tag, including the tag in front of the reader. Upon receiving a tag's response, the reader tries to authenticate the tag by finding a pre-stored record that matches the response message. The authentication process may even need no on-site computation. As a result, such methods can achieve O(1) authentication efficiency if the pre-stored records are properly organized.
The high efficiency of synchronization based approaches comes from the synchronized states between the reader and the tags. However, the number of the synchronized states should be limited. Or else, the prior computing and storing task for the records may not be accomplishable. This limitation offers the DoS attackers the possibility to launch attack. The attack can be conducted in such a way that the malicious reader scans the victim tag continuously. A tag is designed to answer each scan, which consumes a valid state. The DoS attacker can then exhaust the valid states of the tag that were synchronized with the legitimate reader. After that, the basis for the synchronization based approaches is broken. The tag can only generate the response with a used state, which can only match to a used record. This means the response message contain some ''old'' information, which may incur tracking privacy breach.
Avoine et al. [10] have discussed 11 protocols and showed the limitations of some representative protocols in defending the de-synchronization attack, which is in fact a kind of DoS attack. All the 11 protocols but ONE which has no privacy either cannot resistant to DoS attack or can only tolerant limited times of desynchronizations. Most of them rely on the resynchronization during an updating after a successful authentication. However, the DoS attack may have taken place before resynchronization. Thus, it is it is non-trivial to extend to achieve DoS defeating.
Some researchers focus on the ultra-lightweight solutions, employing physically uncloneable functions (PUFs) [32] or bitwise operations [33] as alternative primitives, instead of hash functions. These ultra-lightweight methods need only a few gates thus can be used on very-low cost tags, e.g., those with less than 3000 GE for security [7] . Despite the ultra-lightweight primitives, the order of magnitude for the server-end search efficiency still relies on the protocol design. For example, in [32] the server stores TID i T and PID for each tag T , where TID i T is the i-th round unique temporary identity for T , PID is a set of unique pseudo identity pid j . During authentication, T sends TID i T or pid j directly for a reader's quickly identify. Both TID i T and PID are limited synchronized states between T and the server, which can be DoS attacked. In [33] a pseudonym IDS, which will only be updated after one successful authentication process, is used as an index for match. Such IDS is a synchronized state with only ONE value. When DoS attacked, the IDS will repeat in the tag's messages, arising tracking privacy violation.
Besides the protocols based on symmetric key and ultralightweight primitives, asymmetric cryptography based protocols can also provide efficiency, namely the O(1) efficiency. Moreover, the methods based on public key computation employ no internal states that can be exhausted by the DoS attack. Many works have been done on enabling public key computation for passive RFID tags [19] - [21] . However, few of them consider the energy issue during authentication. On the other hand, even the identification process often encounters failure for the lack of adequate energy [22] . Thus, it is hard for the authentication process, which is based on time and energy consuming public key computation, to be successfully completed without failure. Instead, the authentication process may experience power drop [22] or need to charge the tag several times during one authentication process [20] .
In all, how to design a PPA protocol, which can defend against the DoS attack and satisfy the efficiency for vast deployment, remains open.
B. BACKSCATTING RFID WITH POWER CHARGING
Passive RFID tags work in such a way that they obtain energy from the CW emitted by a reader trying to read it [34] and communicate in the backscatting mode. A well-designed tag may even obtain energy from the ambient [35] .
Thus, it is possible to charge the tag during authentication. What's more, the energy on tag can last for adequate time for computation and communication. The WISP [6] tags can reserve the charged energy with a capacitor for a period of time, e.g., a whole day if the volume of capacitor is adequate. The capacitor on a WISP tag works as a chargeable battery. Existing works have studied the problem of choosing the proper size for the capacitor on a WISP tag to fulfil a given task [36] . The WISP tag as a kind of open source EPC G2 [34] tag is usually used as an implementation platform for intermittent computing [24] , [37] , in which the energy-harvesting devices operate only intermittently when energy is available. Colin et al. achieve to support 1024-bit RSA on WISP5 platform [37] . While the existing studies mainly focus on the fundamental hardware and software support, the study on energy-aware upper-layer protocols or applications is still in urgent need. Or else, the system may encounter problems in specific scenarios, e.g., the Chain [37] method may face the problem of expired data and waste time and energy in a specific exercise recognition application [24] .
Once the energy on a tag is accumulated to a certain level, the tag can afford to do more complicated cryptographic computation without suffer from energy issues such as power drop. It is interesting if a passive RFID tag with adequate energy is capable of defending the DoS attack and providing scalable authentication. To the best of our knowledge, no authentication protocol with the concern of wireless power charging has been proposed before. 
III. STATES-LIMITED SYNCHRONIZATION-BASED PROTOCOL CANNOT DEFEND AGAINST DOS ATTACK
In this section, we briefly prove that it is impossible for an approach based on bounded number of synchronized states to defend against the DoS attacks.
Proof Sketch: A tag utilizing the synchronization-based approach has two statuses, normal and abnormal. When the tag and the reader are synchronized, the tag can be authenticated normally. In the normal status, the tag can be authenticated with O(1) efficiency, meaning O(1) times of access. However, the adversary can launch DoS attack by continuously scan a tag many times. Because RFID tags are designed to automatically react to interrogation, each time the tag will respond with an authentication message that can match a pre-computed and pre-stored value in the database of the reader. This message should vary on each scan to avoid the possible link between the response and the tag. Thus, each query will consume a pre-computed value stored in the backend database. Finally, all the pre-computed values are exhausted and the tag cannot be authenticated with O(1) efficiency any more, unless it respond with a state that used before. There are two cases.
Case 1: The victim tag still tries to authenticate to the reader with an authentication message, which is a pre-computed value stored on the legitimate reader, using a synchronized state. Because all states have been exhausted before this response, the adversary has learned all the valid response messages related to these states. The current authentication message should be the same as one of the historical response message learned by the adversary. The, the adversary can identify the tag using the repeated response and break the privacy of the tag.
Case 2: The tag does not choose to authenticate with a precomputed value. In this case, the tag in abnormal status cannot be authenticated with O(1) efficiency. The shift of the search efficiency for distinguishing the tag in the backend database becomes the reason of privacy leakage.
To conclude, a sophisticated DoS attacker can exhaust the states of a tag that conducts a states-limited synchronizationbased protocol and break its privacy by simply observe the following behaviors of this victim tag.
Indeed, strengthening the synchronization-based approaches requires that the tags can only be processed with the same constant-time efficiency, which corrupts the intrinsic characteristic of synchronization-based approaches that only bounded number of values can be pre-computed and prestored. General synchronization-based approaches are all with limited number of synchronized states. Thus, according to the above proof, current synchronization-based approaches cannot defend against the DoS attacks. To enable DoS attack defending, a tag should be able to emit unbounded number of valid responses. To enable DoS attack defending constant-time authentication, the valid responses that enable O(1) tag search efficiency should be unbounded in number.
IV. The REVIVING-UNDER-DOS PROTOCOL
In this section, we present in detail the RUND protocol. Firstly, we will give an outline. Then, we show the details in the design of the RUND protocol. In the protocol design, we do not restrict to specific cryptographic algorithm. The parameters for implementing the RFID system can be determined respect to the chosen cryptographic algorithms, as what will be shown in Section V.B and Section VIII.
A. OVERVIEW
The reader starts the authentication procedure by sending CW and the challenge to a tag. The tag obtains energy from CW and does not respond until adequate energy is charged in this session.
In this work, we consider the per-tag scenario only, where one reader authenticates with one tag mutually at one time. During authentication, the tag generates the response message according to its energy status and the insider secret information, as illustrated in Fig.1 . Taken cryptographic algorithms as services, it is like a service selection [38] , [39] problem based on energy status. In our design, a tag achieves energy growth after each scan from legitimate or illegitimate readers, e.g., a DoS attacking reader. In this way, the tag gradually accumulates energy.
When the available energy on tag is not enough for response with asymmetric cryptography, the tag has to respond with symmetric cryptography, e.g., utilizing cryptographic hash functions and synchronized states.
When the available energy on tag can afford for response with asymmetric cryptography, the tag responds with public-key computation, e.g., employing 1024 bit RSA and consuming no synchronized states.
B. INITIALIZATION
The tasks for the initialization of the system comprise setting the secrets and synchronized states in the reader and the tags.
In initialization, the reader R obtains a pair of keys (PR R , PU R ) from e.g., the backend server, where PR R is the private key of R and PU R is the related public key. The public key PU R is distributed to each tag.
The reader R knows the unique identifier (ID) as well as the unique symmetric key k i of each tag. Then, R pre-computes and pre-stores a set of records hibits(f (k i , c, pad 1 ), l) for each tag T i . Where c is a counter denoting how many times the current key k i of T i is used,pad 1 is the padding of the
, where c L is a security parameter that can be set empirically. For example, c L can be set as the minimum lifecycle for each tag. Typically, c L ≥ 2. Suppose the output length of cryptographic hash function f and encryption function E are l f and l E , separately. If l E < 2l f , the value of l is set as l f . Otherwise, l is set as l E /2 . When the length of x is larger than that of y, the function hibits(x, y) returns the leftmost y bits of binary number x, or else it returns a string which is x randomly padded to the length of y.
On the tag side, each tag keeps in itself k i , a tag side counter c, the tag ID as ID, and PU R . Initially, the tag side counter c is set to 0.
C. AUTHENTICATION PROCESS
During the authentication, the reader authenticates the tags that enter its working range. Fig. 1 illustrates the steps in the authentication process.
Step 1: The reader challenges the tag T i , which enters its working range, by sending the challenge r 1 with the length of l following a continuous wave CW.
The continuous wave should last for time T pw so that a tag in the working rang of the reader can obtain enough energy. The energy charged in this step is E c .
Step 2: The tag T i responses to R's challenge based on its energy status as well as the insider secret information.
If the energy charged is less than a predefined E 0 , the tag will not respond to the reader in this conversation. This can be done by keep silent until a specified time, e.g., the maximum value of the link timing [34] from reader transmission to tag response, runs out. When the energy on T i is not enough for responding with public key cryptography,T i responds with
After that, T i increases the internal c by 1. In this way, the consumed energy in the responding process, including twice hash computation and communication, is denoted by E sk . When the energy on T i is adequate, T i responds with pad(E(PU R , k i , r 1 ||r 2 ,ID, c)) which is randomly padded to a length of 2l bit, where ID is the unique identifier of T i .
The energy consumed in this process, including once public key encryption and communication, is denoted by E pk .
Step 3: The reader R determines whether to accept T i as legitimate.
Depending on the computing algorithm chosen by T i , the authentication message I from T i may be generated with either hash computation or public key computation. Accordingly, R has to try in both ways for finding a match to fulfil the authentication.
On one hand, R tries to check if I is generated with hash computation. In this case, I = I 1 ||I 2 and I 1 involves no session-related parameter. In other word, R can search in the backend server to find a matching record hibits(f (k i , c , pad 1 ), l) with I 1 . If a match is found, R further checks r 1 in I 2 to avoid the possible replayed messages. Once I 1 and I 2 are matched, T i will be accepted as the legitimate tag corresponding to k i .
On the other hand, R tries to check if I is generated with asymmetric cryptographic computation. This can be done through decrypting the cipher in the received I with PR R . The cipher can be obtained by simply remove the random padding. If the (ID, k i ) pair matches the information stored in the backend server and it is not a replayed message, which can be checked by r 1 and r 2 , T i will be accepted as the legitimate tag related to (ID, k i ).
If none of the above two searching process succeeds, T i will be considered as illegitimate and will not be accepted.
Obviously, the above two matching process can be conducted parallel. Thus, the overall time cost is dominated by the time for searching with public key decryption, which consumes more time.
D. UPDATING PROCESS
If the tag T i is accepted, the updating process takes place, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . First, R generates a messages I 3 = r 3 ||f (k i , r 3 ||I 1 , pad 1 ) for T i to authenticate R, where r 3 is a pseudo random number generated by R. Both r 3 and I 3 are sent to T i . The reader also updates the reader-end key k i shared with T i to k i = f (k i , r 3 , pad 1 ), as well as the pre-computed scores f (k i , c, pad 1 ) for each possible c with the updated key. In case of attacks that trying to disturb the updating, R can preserve for each tag a copy of the old version key and pre-computed records. VOLUME 7, 2019 Then, the tag checks I 3 using r 3 and k i stored on the tag. If I 3 passes the check, T i takes R as a legitimate reader. If R is legitimate, the tag side updating begins. The tag T i updates k i as R and set the counter c on T i to 0.
E. SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
The task of system maintenance is to deal with the events of tag joining or leaving the system. When a tag is joining the system, it will be treated by initialize it, on both tag side and reader side.
When a tag is leaving, the system maintenance component has to disable the tag, other than simply delete all the historical information in case of management requirements such as auditing. This can be done by just label the tag as unusable. All the secret information and the logs of this tag are still kept in the system.
V. DETERMINE THE PARAMETERS
With the above protocol, the goal of reviving under DoS attack can be fulfilled as what will be shown in Section VI.C, if the parameters involved in the protocol are carefully chosen. For example, how to design the tag to guarantee that it can gain adequate energy under malicious scans, and its states cannot be exhausted before the tag can fulfill public key cryptography, and etc.
In Section V.A, we give the rules that the system design should follow in below. Then, we show how to determine the parameters in Section V.B. For the easy of reading, we give a table of main symbols in the paper in Table 1 .
A. THE RULES NEED TO FOLLOW
To achieve DoS defending and other security properties for the RUND protocol, we propose the following 3 rules.
Firstly, the energy obtained before a tag responds should be enough for it to complete the responding task. Specifically, the energy should be more than needed for completing the activation, cryptographic computation and communication tasks.
Rule 1: A tag only responds after it obtains enough energy. The energy should be more than needed to active the tag from no power status and support the tag's response with cryptographic computation. The energy should be adequate for response with symmetric key computation but inadequate for response with public key computation.
We have the following inequality according to Rule 1.
where E ac is the amount of energy needed for turning a tag from the no power status to the active status. The left side of Rule 1 is needed for the bootstrapping of the protocol. Otherwise, a tag with no power may not be able to conduct the protocol. It is because the tag cannot obtain enough energy to enter the active status and complete the responding task with symmetric key computation.
The right side of Rule 1 is needed for energy efficiency. Otherwise, a tag with no power can be directly charged for responding with public key computation. As a result, the tags will always respond with asymmetric cryptography and never respond with symmetric cryptography. That is time consuming for both charging and computation.
We can find that, a tag under scans, no matter if the scan is malicious, will accumulate power. It is because the energy charged is larger than the energy consumed for responding process, with symmetric cryptography. In this way, a tag whose energy can only afford to respond with symmetric computation may accumulate enough energy for responding with asymmetric computation under continuous DoS attack.
To beat the Rule 1, the adversary may wait a period to let the energy of a tag fall to a level that it cannot complete public cryptography computing. In order to defend against such cases, Rule 2 and Rule 3 need to be satisfied.
Rule 2: The largest number of query times needed before a tag could respond with public key cryptography is not more than the lifecycle of the current key in the tag.
Rule 2 can be represented by the following inequality.
where E idle = T intv × P low denotes the maximum energy loss during the adversary's tracking interval. Where T intv is a parameter we introduced in to denote the maximum time interval between two queries for the adversary to keep tracking a tag, P low is the power consumption when the tag is in low power mode. For example, T intv can be set as 15 minutes, denoting that the tracking of a tag may fail if the adversary does not communicate with the tag in 15 minutes. This parameter is reasonable, because the tag in amount of tags may move anywhere along with who/what it is attached to. After a period of time, the tag may move out of scope of the adversary. Rule 2 means that before the counter inside a tag is exhausted, the tag can do once public key cryptography and emit a response. Moreover, the tag will always do public key cryptography under attack, if Rule 3 is satisfied.
Rule 3: If at a time point, the tag is able to respond with public key cryptography. After that, the time needed before the energy on tag cannot afford one response with public key cryptographic computing is larger than the least tracking interval needed for an adversary.
Assuming E x as the available energy on the tag since last communication based on symmetric-key cryptography.
Then we have the following inequality from Rule 3.
Then we get
Because E x is the point after which the tag is able to respond with public key cryptography, we also have
Thus, we have
Then,
Rule 3 restricts that the adversary cannot lower the power on the tag from be capable of public key cryptography to only afford symmetric key computing while keep tracking. Rule 3 is needed, or else the adversary can exhaust the limited states, which is denoted by the internal counter, on the tag when the tag is responding with symmetric key computation.
Rule 3 also implies that after a protocol conduction, either complete or incomplete, and a period of waiting, which is shorter than the tracking period for the adversary, the tag will still accumulate energy.
As we would analyze on the security and privacy characteristics in Section VII, the above 3 rules should be sufficient. As for the necessity, we have explained why each of the rules is necessary. Thus, a rule set comprised of Rule 1, Rule 2, and Rule 3, is sufficient and necessary.
B. DETERMINE THE DESIGNING PARAMETERS
The architecture of our approach is presented in the above sections, remaining some design related issues. One problem is how to set the charging time to make sure a tag can obtain enough energy following the above rules. Another problem is how to determine the size of the capacitor on the tag. We show the determination of these parameters in this subsection.
Fortunately, there are many works on the power charging and power loss of a tag [20] , [21] , [25] . We can combine the rules we proposed with the existing works to determine the designing parameters.
Firstly, we present in detail the process of determining the parameters that guarantee a tag can obtain adequate energy before it responds. Then, we show how a tag knows which algorithm to choose according to the energy status.
Based on the Friis Transmission equation, the amount of energy a tag obtains in the charging process can be denoted by E c .
where, T pw denotes the time of charging, P R is the receiving power of the tag, η is the energy efficiency, P T is the power of the sending signals from the scanning reader, G T is the gain of the transmit antenna, G R is the gain of the receive antenna, f is the frequency of the reader's RF signals, l c is the lightspeed, and d is the distance between the sending and the receiving antennas.
From the above equation, we can find that the energy obtained by the tag is in proportion to the charging time. If the minimum energy needed for a tag is determined, the minimum charging time can be accordingly computed. We can set this minimum charging time as the required charging time for each query, so as to ascertain the tag under query can obtain adequate energy. We hereby present the determining of the infimum value for E c and T pw in the following.
During charging, a tag works in the low power mode and consumes minimum power. For example, a WISP tag which stops all computation but still maintains state consumes only 0.75 µW in the Power Save Mode (LP4), ''RAM-retention mode'' [25] . The energy consumption may be even negligible, if the tags are specially designed to keep the on-tag discharging current to be 0 [40] . We assume without loss of generality the on-tag power consumption is P low , which is tiny but positive.
Given the rules listed above in Section V.A, we can now compute the parameters for a tag.
The parameters l c and π are constant. For massmanufactured tags, the G R , η, E sk , E pk , P low are very similar and can be measured and taken as constant.
For a mass-manufactured reader, P T and G T can be determined by the standards, FCC regulations, and product specification. The range of d and f are in fact the working range and working frequency of the RFID system, which can be found in the technical specification of the system. Specifically, the value of d can be set as the specified upper bound in working range, to guarantee the legitimate tags following the product specification and the ROUND protocol can obtain enough energy to work.
The tracking interval T intv and the upper bound of counter c L can be defined empirically. Both of them can also be determined according to the privacy requirement of users.
Combining the above rules, we got the following inequality, which shows the minimum value of E c .
Then, we can determine the minimum charging time related to the minimum E c .
Reminding c L ≥ 2, we further get the following equation to compute the minimum charging time (T pw ) min , where the subscript min denotes to choose the minimum value, the function max(x, y) gives the maximum value between x and y.
Thus, the value of (T pw ) min can be determined. If the charged no shorter than (T pw ) min , the tags following our approach can obtain enough energy for protocol running. We choose charging time as a key parameter for the protocol, because such parameter is easy to control.
The last problem left is how to enable a tag to choose the appropriate algorithm according to its energy status.
After the charging process by legitimate or illegitimate reader, the tag can measure the voltage of the on-tag capacitor, denoted by V . As we mentioned above, the voltage below which the tag enters the low power mode is denoted by V low . Then the available energy on this tag can be computed by the following equation, where E a denotes the available energy and C denotes the tag's capacitor size.
The threshold V low is a working parameter that can be found in the white paper from the tag manufactory. The response costs, e.g., E pk and E sk , of mass-manufactured tags are similar and can be measured in advance. The tag can decide how to respond based on the available energy. If E a ≥ E pk , the tag responds with public-key cryptography. Else, if E pk ≥ E a ≥ E sk , the tag responds employing hash computations. The thresholding voltages when E a equals E pk or E sk can be pre-computed. Then, the tags following the RUND protocol can determine how to respond by simply measure the voltage.
The multi-path effect may affect the energy gained and further break the adequate energy requirements. A sophisticated adversary may also try to lower the energy by adapting its emission power. In these cases, a victim tag may not be able to obtain enough energy. When computing the minimum charging time in the above, we only consider the distance d and set d as the upper-bound working range in the product specification to make sure that legitimate tags following the product specification and the ROUND protocol can obtain enough energy. For more general cases, we can set a lower bound of the energy obtained during charging, denoted by E 0 . If the energy obtained for a tag is less than E 0 , the tag keeps silence after the CW. The value of E 0 can be determined by measuring the amount of energy obtained when a legitimate tag following the designing guidelines works with the upper-bound working range in the product specification. In other words, E 0 can be set as the energy charged when a legitimate tag on edge of the working distance is charged with T pw that is no less than (T pw ) min . The energy can be computed and specified empirically by measuring the on-tag voltage before and after CW.
The carefully chosen designing parameters can satisfy the energy demand for the tags running the RUND protocol. The tags can accumulate energy following the rules. With more and more energy, the tag becomes more and more powerful under malicious scans. Finally, the DoS defending property can be achieved, as will be analyzed in Section VII.A.
VI. OUR MODEL
In this section, we give the definition of our model, including privacy model, correctness, and soundness. For the privacy model, we give the adversarial model and define the tracking privacy notions. Our model is based on the existing works on RFID privacy models [41] , [42] .
A. PRIVACY MODEL 1) ADVERSARIAL MODEL
Our adversarial model is mainly based on [41] , which is based on the well-studied notion of (left-or-right) indistinguishability. One difference is that we only consider one reader in the system. RFID readers are generally considered with adequate resources and they can connect to each other quickly in the same system. In [41] , the Drawtag oracle returns ⊥ when a pair of tag are not in the same system. Thus, we take all the readers in the system as a whole reader. The tracking interval is another main difference between our model and [41] . Introducing the notion of tracking interval, our model aims at tracking privacy for the first time, other than indistinguishability privacy.
The adversary A interacts with the RFID system S with a set of oracles. The experiment that the challenger plays with A is as follows, where the tracking interval T intv is a predefined security parameter.
Exp S,A (T intv ):
The challenger chose a random bit b, where b ∈ {0, 1}.
Stage 2: A interacts with the challenger with a set of oracles O, which we will define in the following and are related to the value of b, in polynomial time. The time interval between two inaction of A with the tag should not be larger than T intv .
Stage 3: A outputs a guess bit g and the experiment returns Exp S,A (T intv ) = (g == b).
The oracles O that A can access are as follows:
• CreateTag(ID): The oracle registers the tag with identifier ID to the reader R and returns a reference T i .
• Launch(R): After a new protocol run launched on R, R returns a session identifier π .
• DrawTag(T i , T j ): Given a pair of tag references, this oracle returns a monotonic counter vtag as a virtual tag reference, and stores the (vtag, T i , T j ) in a table B, depending on the selection of T i and T j . The vtag refers to either the 'left' tag
Only when T i (T j ) is selected as the left (right) tag for the first time, the oracle returns vtag. Otherwise, it returns ⊥. If either T i or T j is an insider tag, the oracle returns ⊥.
• Free(vtag) b : The oracle retrieves the triple (vtag, T i , T j ) from B and erase the volatile memory of the tag referred by vtag to reset it. Then the triple is deleted from B.
• SendTag(vtag, m) b : The oracle retrieves the triple (vtag, T i , T j ) from B and sends the message m to the tag referred by vtag. It returns the reply m from the tag if the triple is found in B. Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
• SendReader(R,π , m): The oracle sends the message m to R in session π and returns the reply m from R. If no active session π exists, it returns ⊥.
• Result(R,π ): The oracle determines whether or not R accepts π as a protocol run that ends with successful authentication of a tag. It returns ⊥ if the session π is either not exist or is not finished.
• Corrupt(T i ): The oracle returns all the internal states of T i . We restrict the Corrupt oracle in our model to not corrupt the drawn tags, e.g., the virtual tag vtag, just the same as the restriction in [41] .
• CreateInsider(ID): The oracle creates an insider tag T i by first calling CreateTag to create a new tag T i and then calling Corrupt on the new tag. Then the tag T i is added to the insider tag list L. This oracle models the action that the adversary leverages the internal states of corrupted tags to attack uncorrupted tags. It is the same as the compromising behavior in some previous works [41] . A wins the privacy game if and only if g = b. The advantage of the adversary over random guess is:
The draw and free of a vtag simulates the tag's entering and leaving of the adversary's range. When freed, the tag is out of control of the adversary. For example, the adversary failed to communicate with vtag in T intv and lost tracking to it. Then the tag's state is re-randomized and the adversary cannot know if the tag was the active one which is drawn. When a tag is corrupted, it can only be drawn with a DrawTag(T i , T i ) oracle.
2) TRACKING PRIVACY
The privacy notions in our model are similar to the notions in [41] , except that they are tracking privacy other than indistinguishability privacy. We use a suffix ''−t'' to emphasize the tracking privacy notion, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . There are 10 privacy notions, divided according to 3 dimensions of A's ability. Depending on the ability in calling the Corrupt oracle, the adversary can be strong (without restriction in calling oracles), destructive (destructive corrupt), forward (can only call Corrupt after the first call), or weak (cannot corrupt). If the adversary can call the Result oracle, it is wide, otherwise it is narrow. The insider adversary can call the CreateInsider oracle.
The notion X ⇒ Y means that if the protocol is X -private then the protocol is Y -private. Now we present our definition of tracking privacy, where X is used to denote one of the above 10 privacy notions. In the following paper, we will denote computational privacy when we talk about privacy.
Definition 1 (Tracking Privacy): A RFID system S, is said to be unconditionally provide X tracking privacy, if and only if for all adversaries A and T intv ,Adv S,A (T intv ) = 0. Similarly, S provides computational X tracking privacy if for all polynomial time adversaries,Adv S,A (T intv ) < ε(k).
There is a main difference between our notion of tracking privacy and the indistinguishable privacy as follows.
Given two objects, the indistinguishable privacy requires that it is hard to distinguish one object from the other, at any time. It is usually too safe to be accomplished. We observed for the tracking behavior that a tag in a group of tags may move anywhere along with who/what it is attached to. After a period of time, the tag may move out of scope of the adversary. Thus, to keep tracking a tag in practice needs to communicate with the tag periodically. Our definition of tracking privacy takes this observation into consideration. It is a weaker but more practical privacy notion compared to the indistinguishable privacy.
3) CORRECTNESS AND SOUNDNESS
First, we give the definition for correctness, which ensures the successful authentication of legitimate tags.
Definition 2 (Correctness): A RFID scheme is correct if the false negative rate of the identification is negligible.
The false negative rate is the rate that a legitimate tag is judged as an illegitimate one.
Then, we give the definition of soundness. The soundness property requires illegitimate tag can only pass a legitimate reader's verification with negligible probability.
Definition 3 (Soundness): A RFID scheme is sound if no polynomial adversary can impersonate any uncorrupted tag and succeed with non-negligible probability.

VII. SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF THE RUND PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the security and privacy characteristics of our approach. First we focus on the DoS defending property of RUND, because responding with hash computation involves synchronized states. Then we analyze the tracking privacy. Finally, we show the ability of the RUND protocol to fulfil the requirements on correctness, soundness, confidentiality, forward secrecy, and the resistance to replay attack, timing attack, and compromising attack. Our analysis is based on the existing works on RFID privacy [41] , [42] . We also use a symbolic approach to prove the properties automatically with ProVerif [43] where needed, as shown in Fig. 4 [p, p ] . This primitive is used to prove process equivalence where the processes have the same structure and differ only in the choice of parameters, either p or p . The equivalence holds if the attacker cannot distinguish these two situations. -!proc. This primitive captures the parallel executing of unbounded number of process proc.
A. DEFENDING AGAINST THE DOS ATTACK
We focus on a general DoS attack, where an adversary not only consumes the resources of the reader and the tags, but also launches further attack to break the privacy. On the reader-end, an adversary may force the reader to do public cryptographic computation to consume its resources. This is not applicable because it is a reader other than a tag initializes the RUND protocol. The reader thus knows when a response from a tag will be returned, which will incur the reader-end public key computation. If a response message does not appear at the right time, the reader should be aware of attack. As a result, the DoS attack will not work on reader.
On the tag-end, the problem is more complicated. When a tag responds with hash computation, the RUND protocol employs the values of the on-tag counter. Defending the DoS attack becomes avoiding the adversary from exhausting the counter. On each query, the tag should emit a valid response, which consumes a valid c. According to Rule 2, a tag will accumulate adequate energy for responding with public key computation before all valid values of counter are exhausted.
When responding with asymmetric key cryptography, the valid responses are generated with r 1 and r 2 , which are pseudo random numbers and can hardly be exhausted. According to Rule 2 a tag will certainly accumulate energy under each scan from the adversary. Moreover, the energy of the tag will never be lowered to be inadequate for public key computation under continuous malicious scans, unless the adversary failed to keep tracing the tag. Thus, the adversary cannot exhaust the counter insider a tag. The DoS attack will not work on tag.
To conclude, the RUND protocol can defend against the DoS attack on either reader or tag.
B. TRACKING PRIVACY OF RUND
An adversary may try to track a tag conducting the RUND protocol. Following our model proposed in Section VI.A, firstly we consider the case without Corrupt, Result, and insider oracles. Then, we will introduce these oracles.
Based on the analysis in Section VII.A, a tag responds with symmetric computation and accumulates energy when the energy is inadequate according to Rule 3.
There may be two cases when available energy on tag is not enough. 1) The on-tag energy is inadequate and the tag is accumulating.
2) The energy on tag falls to be inadequate for public key cryptographic computing because the adversary just waits and emits no message.
In case 1), the tag responds with hash values but the on-tag counter will not be exhausted according to Rule 2. The responses from the tag vary as the counter increases during each response. Due to the one-way property of cryptographic hash functions, the adversary can hardly find the relation between the responses. Because it needs to break the pre-image resistance of cryptographic hash functions with a complexity of O(2 l ).
According to Rule 3, once a tag is able to conduct asymmetric cryptography, it will always be able to during the adversary's continuous attacking. The only exception happens if the adversary waits until it cannot communicate with the tag to keep tracking the tag. At this time, the tag is out of scope of the adversary. The adversary's tracking fails. Thus, case 2) is also not applicable for the adversary.
When a tag responds with public key cryptographic computation, the adversary needs to break the public key cryptographic function to correlate a tag with its authentication messages. This requires the adversary to solve the computationally hard problems, such as discrete logarithm or large number factoring.
An adversary may not query the tag but let the energy on a tag drop to a level that the counter is reset to 0. Then the adversary can observe if replicated messages appears. This will not happen according to Rule 3, which implies that a charged tag can afford the energy needed during a tracking interval. Now, we now introduce the issues related to Corrupt, Result, and CreateInsider oracles.
The RUND protocol updates k i and c after each successful authentication. A strong adversary may try to use a Corrupt query before and after a protocol run to break the privacy of the tag. According to the restriction on draw and free, the corrupted tag will reveal no information about b because it should be drawn simultaneously as the left and right tag. Then, the corrupted tag acts just like the insider tags. Because the tags do not share secrete information between each other, corrupting and obtaining the internal information of tags will not provide useful information for the adversary.
A wider attacker can observe the output of the protocol to suspect the status of tags. In RUND protocol, the legitimate tags, no matter whether with either inadequate energy or with adequate energy for public key cryptographic computation, can pass the authentication, as what will be shown in the correctness analysis. Furthermore, the tags, with different energy level, will act with the same timing characteristic, as what will be shown in the analysis for the timing attack resistance.
To conclude, the RUND protocol is wide-strong-t private. We also employ ProVerif to prove the tracking resistance of RUND, focusing on the cases when the tag is responding with hash. This is done by proving 1) the attacker can obtain none of k i , c, ID during authentication, and 2) the attacker cannot distinguish a tag with k i from a tag with either a random key or the updated key of k i . We check the result of query attacker(Key), query attacker(Tid), and query attacker(c) to prove 1). We check choice [Key, Key_random] and choice[Key, new_Key'] to prove 2). The results of all the queries are true, as illustrated in Fig. 4a, Fig. 4b, Fig. 4c,  Fig.4k, and Fig. 4l , which means that the tracking resistance is achieved.
From the above analysis we can learn that the internal counter helps to tolerant de-synchronization. Moreover, the rules proposed avoid the counter from being exhausted and guarantee the tracking privacy.
Some work studies the physical layer distinguishability of tags [44] , with e.g., an expensive oscilloscope that can capture nanosecond differences. Fortunately, such attack is not easy to launch. Such devices need continuous power supply and not fit for continuous tracking. Thus, privacy protection from the protocol level still makes sense.
C. CORRECTNESS
When the tag responds with hash computation, both tag side and reader side are synchronized. When responding with public key computation, the authentication relies on decryption.
When the inputs are determined, both hash computation and public key computation output deterministic result. The use of either cryptographic hash functions or public key cryptography is mature.
The only concern is whether the tag will be de-synchronized with the reader while under attack. The desynchronization can only happen when 1) the counter inside the tag is not synchronized with the reader; or 2) the update state on both sides is not synchronized, e.g., the adversary disturbs the key updating on either side. The 1) case will not happen, because the counter is limited and will not be exhausted according to Rule 2. In case of 2), the backend system connected to the reader can store an older version of the key for the authentication of un-updated key.
The hibits function returns a l-bit string. The definition of l depends on the output length of the chosen cryptographic functions, as shown in Section IV.B and Table 1 . If l E < 2l f , the value of l is set as l f , which means l is set as the output length of f . In this case, the hibits(f , l) returns the leftmost l bits of f , which is just the same as the output of f . Otherwise, if l E ≥ 2l f the value of l is set as l E /2 , which is no less than l f . In this case, the output of hibits(f , l) is the output of f concatenated with a random padding. Combining with the definition of I 1 and I 2 , both of them contain the full bits from the output of the hash function f . Thus, the use of I 1 and I 2 are the same as using hash values. The success rate of the authentication will not be affected by the hibits function.
We prove the correctness of RUND with ProVerif, by checking query event(RAcceptT) ==> (event (TRespondR(I )) ==> event(SendChallenge(r1))) and query event(TAcceptR) ==> (event(RSendAuthenM(r3, I 3)) ==> event(RAcceptT)), where RAcceptT means the reader accepts the tag as legal and TAcceptR means the tag accepts the reader as legal. The results of both queries are true, which proves the correctness of mutual authentication, as shown in Fig. 4i and Fig. 4j . We also checked query event (TUpdate) ==> event(TAcceptR) && new_Key = new_Key' and query event(RUpdate) ==> event (RAcceptT) && new_Key = new_Key', where TUpdate and RUpdate captures the updating even in tag and reader, respectively. The results of both queries are true, which proves the same updating happens correctly in both tag and reader, as shown in Fig. 4g and Fig. 4h .
D. SOUNDNESS
The RUND protocol employs the tag's key and the reader's private key as secrets. With safe cryptographic functions, the adversary cannot find the key also cannot generate the relative outputs of the functions with non-negligible probability. When the tag responds with hash function, the adversary can only pass the authentication when she/he correctly guesses both I 1 and I 2 at the same time. Without knowing the key k i , this equals to find 2 second pre-image of a cryptographic hash function, which is hard according to the second pre-image resistance property of cryptographic hash functions with a complexity of (2 l ). When the tag responds with public key cryptography, the adversary does not know either the reader's private key or the tag's key. Thus, it cannot decrypt the cipher correctly to spoof a legitimate reader with non-negligible probability. Otherwise, the chosen public key cryptographic function is broken.
Besides, replayed messages also cannot pass the authentication, as will be analyzed for the replay attack resistance.
We prove the soundness of RUND with ProVerif, by checking 1) the confidentiality of k i , ID,c, and PR R ; 2) if random key based spoofing will be rejected; and 3) if replayed message will be reject. The proof of 1) can be found in subsection VII.E, the proof of 3) can be found in subsection VII.G. We check query event(RAcceptFT) for 2), as the result illustrated in Fig. 4f . The result is true, showing spoofing tag cannot pass the authentication.
E. CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality requires no secret information should be leaked during authentication. In the RUND protocol, no secret information is sent in plaintext. To get the key in I 1 , I 2 , or I 3 , the adversary has to find the pre-image of a cryptographic hash function, which needs to break the preimage resistance property and thus is hard. To get the secret information in E(PU R , k i , r 1 ||r 2 , ID,c), the adversary needs to solve the mathematical problems that are currently admitted to with no efficient solution. Thus, the confidentiality is guaranteed.
To prove the confidentiality, we checked query attacker (Key), query attacker(Tid), query attacker(c) and query attacker (PR_R) . All the results are true, as illustrated in Fig. 4a, Fig. 4b, Fig. 4c, and Fig. 4d , which means that the attacker cannot obtain k i , c, ID, or PR R during the authentication process.
F. FORWARD SECRECY
Forward secrecy in RFID authentication requires that keys stored in a compromised tag will not reveal the content in previous messages sent by this tag.
Following the RUND protocol, the unique key is updated, after the tag is successfully authenticated using a one-way cryptographic hash function. Thus, it should be hard for an adversary to use an updated version of a key to infer the original key or the content protected by the original key, which needs to break the pre-image property of cryptographic hash functions.
As the pre-image resistance is well known as hard to break, no proof with ProVerif is needed.
G. REPLAY ATTACK RESISTANCE
The adversary may try to record the authentication message from a tag and replay it later to pass the authentication and fool the reader. This problem is similar to the clone resistance.
When responding with hash computation, a pseudo random number r 1 and an increasing counter c are employed as inputs. Because the adversary cannot predict the value of r 1 in advance, a replayed message will not match.
When responding with public cryptography, two pseudo random numbers r 1 and r 2 from the reader and the tag are used as inputs to generate the cipher. The pseudo random numbers prevents replay attack.
As the protocol employs synchronized states when the tag responds with hash computation, one may worry that if the responses will loop when the values of c are used out. As we have analyzed in Section VII.A, according to Rule 2 the tag will accumulate enough energy for asymmetric cryptography before the counter is exhausted. Once the tag's energy is adequate, the tag under attack will always respond with public key cryptographic computation according to Rule 3. In all, the tag following the RUND protocol varies its response messages with the help of the designing rules. A replayed message will never pass the authentication.
To prove the replay attack resistance, we check the query inj-event(RAcceptT)==>(inj-event(TRespondR(I )). The result is true as showing in Fig. 4e , showing that only the authentication messages that never appear before can be accepted.
H. TIMING ATTACK RESISTANCE
In the timing attack, an adversary can utilize time differences in the behavior of either tag or reader to conduct further attacks.
In the RUND protocol, the efficiency of the computing and searching process is constant. The communication cost for sending authentication messages are the same, as we restricts the length of these messages. We suggest to further fill up the difference in computation costs by let the tags with less cost do some idle loop. For example, when the tag responds with hash computation, it can do some idle loop until the time difference between hash computation and public key cryptography is filled up. The same work can be done on the reader side. Then, the time difference is ironed out and the timing attack is resisted.
I. COMPROMISING ATTACK RESISTANCE
In the compromising attack, an adversary compromises some tags in the system and obtains all secrets in the compromised tags. The compromising ability of the adversary is in fact an insider attacker defined in [41] . The adversary may further try to deduce the secrets of other tags in the system. Tags in the RUND protocol do not share secrets. As a result, the compromised tags will not leak the secrets of uncompromised tags.
VIII. PERFORMANCE
In this section, we analyze the performance of the RUND protocol, which is important to the quality of service in edge computing [45] , [46] . Note that we did not specify the hash function and public-key cryptographic functions in RUND. In fact, RUND is a general protocol architecture.
First, we focus on the cost for computation and communication. The RUND protocol provides O(1) authentication efficiency, with either hash or public key cryptographic computation. The difference in the time costs between the two kinds of computation is filled up for privacy protection, as discussed in Section VII.H . Thus, the performance of the computation and communication is bounded by the performance with asymmetric cryptography. Fortunately, such cost is rational, while some works have been done on employing public key cryptography on passive tags [19] - [21] .
The tags may need more gates to afford hash and public key cryptography. Fortunately, many methods can be used to lower the hardware overhead. For example, the SQUASH algorithm [47] requires little resource and is a simplified implementation of the Rabin scheme, Yang et al. [48] proposed a method for commercial off-the-shelf RFID tags to conduct on-tag hashing without any hardware modification and fabrication.
Then, we show the performance in charging. A passive tag in RFID system needs to be wirelessly powered for responding. In the RUND protocol, a tag also needs to be charged for a time of at least (T pw ) min , which is more efficient than directly charge a tag for public key computation according to Rule 1.
Based on the analysis in Section V.B and the existing works about the energy of tags [21] , [49] , we can numerically determine the reasonable value of the needed charging energy E c . We also discuss the general case with un-specific cryptographic algorithms as well.
According to a work on long computations on RFID platform [21] , RSA, encrypting 1024-bit data under a 1024-bit public key and a constant exponent (65537), requires a capacity of about 8467.2 µJ for continuously running with enough energy. While a hash function such as SHA-1 requires only 66.5 µJ, and SHA-256 requires about 133 µJ. That means to charge a tag directly for RSA-1024 computation needs about 127.2 times the time needed for SHA-1 computation and about 63.7 times the time needed for SHA-256. Assuming T intv is set as 5 minutes, then the power consumption in low power mode needs E idle = 225 µJ when the LP4 mode consumes 0.75 µW. The measurements by [49] show that the energy cost for a 64 bytes packet needs about 137 µJ.
Combining with the computation and communication cost, the charging for directly response with RSA-1024 method needs 8467.2 + 137×2 = 8741.2 µJ. Using our approach, response with SHA-256 needs E sk = 2 × 133 + 137 × 2 = 540 µJ, response with RSA-1024 needs E pk = 8467.2 + 137 × 2 = 8741.2 µJ.
The infimum of E c is a strictly monotone decreasing function of c L . When c L is small, e.g. c L equals 2, the least available E c is (0.5E pk + E sk + 1.5E idle ), which is 5248.1 µJ. When c L is big enough, the least available E c approaches (0.5E pk + 0.5E sk + 1.5E idle ), which is 4978.1 µJ. Combining with the computation and communication cost, the gradual charging approach needs 5248.1 µJ to 4978.1 µJ. Compared with the 8741.2 µJ needed when charge directly for response with RSA-1024, our method can save about 40.0% charging time for boosting authentication when c L = 2, and about 43.1% when c L approaches infinity. As a special case, our method needs 4978.1 µJ for boosting the authentication when c L is set 1024, which saves about 43.1% charging time. This value for c L is usually used as a bound in states-limited synchronization-based approaches [31] , with a 10 bits long counter. Fig. 5 illustrates the impact of the tracking interval and counter length to the infimum of E c . Where c = 1 when the length of c is 0. The infimum of E c decreases as T intv decreases. The values for the infimum of E c becomes stable when the length of c is no smaller than 2. Thus, the length of the counter can be selected accordingly. Specifically, when T intv is set as 5 minutes, the value for the infimum of E c is 4978.1 µJ, with the length of the counter is 2. This requires a capacitor of to 1152.3 µF at most when the voltage drops from 3.3 V to 1.5 V [25] , which is applicable. We suggest to set a small T intv . It is reasonable because otherwise a big T intv may leave the adversary enough time to track a tag or its owner from side channel. For example, the adversary may have more time to find or stick something to the person/object that the victim tag is attached to. More generally, we can compute the percent on energy saving P ES . P ES ≤ E pk − (E c ) min /E pk (13) where (E c ) min is the minimum value of E c related to (T pw ) min . Then P ES mainly depends on the ratio of the cost for symmetric-key and public-key cryptographic algorithm. The bigger the difference on costs, the more percentage of energy our approach can save. Reminding that E c is in proportion to T pw . That means our approach can shorten the bootstrapping charging time, compared with the charging directly for public-key cryptography strategy. The overall authentication time is accordingly shortened, either. The main reason that we choose SHA-256 and RSA as samples to illustrate the performance is that we can numerically compute the parameters based on the results in existing work. The security properties we need for the cryptographic hash function are the pre-image resistance and second pre-image resistance. While SHA-1 is strong enough with 80-bit strength, we still chose SHA-2 as an example because many organizations have recommended its replacement by SHA-2 or SHA-3 since 2010.
For real applications, we suggest to accommodate the choice of hash function to the application requirements for a better balance between resource demand and security requirements, e.g., using ECC instead of RSA or using SHA-224 instead of SHA-256. We suggested in our paper to adopt the WISP platform, which is a kind of open source passive tag that follows the EPC G2 standard. Colin et al. [37] built a system, which supports the 1024-bit RSA, using the WISP5 platform which has an RF energy-harvesting power system on the tag. The hardware integration level of commercial tags will also grow quickly according to the Moore's Law. Thus, we believe the proposed solution will be practical soon as the developing of technology. The power issue for computation and communication with public key cryptography is not a trivial problem. E.g., Buettner et al. [22] have noticed that power drop may cause the failure of identification process for passive RFID tags. Our work leverages the power from DoS attacker and provides an applicable way to supply adequate power for the tags to complete the privacy-preserving authentication process. Using the method to shift between symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography according to energy status, the energy consumption can be reduced, as illustrated above. The shifting is just like a smart service selection [50] . The reducing in energy requirement will not only shorten the bootstrapping time but also decrease the possible failures caused by inadequate energy. For the attacked tags, adequate power is guaranteed by the rules, as specified in Section V.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we prove that states-limited synchronizationbased approaches cannot defend against the DoS attack. Then, we leverage the work mode of passive RFID tags and propose a DoS defending PPA protocol with O(1) efficiency. The core idea is to gather energy from malicious DoS scans and strengthen the victim tag's energy for cryptographic computation. We also give 3 designing rules to ensure the security and privacy of the system. Our approach can save at least 40.0% boosting time in energy charging when SHA-256 and RSA-1024 are used while the tracking interval is 5 minutes, compared with the charging directly for public-key cryptographic computation method. Our work may provide a probability to strengthen the security and privacy for energy-aware low-cost IoT devices in edge computing. 
